Technical documentation
The purpose of the system, its limits, data sources, integrations and how the model operates. The description has to be enough for someone who did not build the system to understand what it does and what it does not.
Article
This article is written for owners and for the people responsible for technology or processes in small and mid-sized companies that use, or plan to use, chatbots, generative tools or AI systems of their own. It shows which information and mechanisms are worth preparing technically before the conversation with a lawyer. It does not settle whether a particular system falls under particular obligations, or whether a company complies with the EU AI Act.
The article is long, so it starts with the answer. The rest of the text expands on it.
Three terms run through the whole text. A provider is a company that places a system on the market under its own name or brand. A deployer is a company that uses a system in its own operations. The same company is often both - for different systems.
A third term is the high-risk system. It is, among other things, a system that acts as a safety component of a regulated product, or one used in an area listed in Annex III to the AI Act, such as recruiting staff and assessing candidates, decisions on access to essential services, or certain biometric uses. What decides is the intended purpose of the system and the way it is used, not the model it runs on.
One example runs through the article: a small service business offers a chatbot on its website to answer customer questions about its services and lead times. The chatbot runs on a ready-made tool bought on subscription. At each step we show what the example means in practice. A chatbot like this is, as a rule, not a high-risk system. That could change if a similar system were used to assess job candidates.
Before anyone assesses the system legally, someone has to be able to say what it does.
The EU AI Act places obligations on systems, but checking whether a company meets them takes material: a description of the system, a trace of its decisions and a statement of who is accountable for them. A lawyer cannot prepare it alone, because they do not know how the system behaves in practice. An auditor cannot reconstruct logs that were never switched on.
In the example company, that material is a handful of plain facts: which tool the chatbot runs on, what customer data passes through it, at which point a conversation is handed to a person, and whether transcripts are kept for longer than a few days. It is the company that has to gather and write those facts down - nobody else can do it for them.
That is why the technical work makes sense whatever the classification turns out to be. If the system falls outside the high-risk requirements, the company still gains a list of its AI tools, clear decision boundaries and a record from which it can explain why the model answered as it did. If it falls inside them, the same work shortens the road to compliance instead of starting it from zero.
The rules phase in, and the timetable was adjusted after the regulation came into force. Below is the state of play in September 2026 - check the current version at the source before you decide anything.
The roles matter here in practice, because the transparency obligations in Article 50 are split between roles and types of system. The provider of a system meant to interact directly with people designs it so the user knows they are talking to an AI - unless that is obvious. The provider of a system that generates synthetic content - text, images, audio or video - has a separate duty: to mark that content in a machine-readable format. The deployer discloses deepfakes and labels AI-generated text published to inform the public on matters of public interest. Only two conditions together lift that last duty: the text went through human review or editorial control, and a person or company holds editorial responsibility for the publication. A spell-check or a quick read-through is not enough.
The company in our example buys its chatbot on subscription, so the notice about talking to an AI belongs to the vendor. What stays on the company's side is checking that the tool actually shows it, and not switching that notice off - quite apart from the fact that a chatbot like this is, as a rule, not a high-risk system.
The deferral of the remaining duties is not a reason to wait. Documentation, logs and a description of oversight take months to produce, and the material for them only accumulates while the system is recording it. A company that switches event logging on only when asked will not reconstruct a decision made a year earlier.
Since February 2025
Applies to every company that uses AI systems
The practices the regulation treats as unacceptable are banned, scoring people on social behaviour among them. The basis: Regulation 2024/1689.
Since August 2026
Applies to providers of systems that talk to people or generate content, and to companies that publish model-generated material
The provider of a system that talks to people has to design it so the user knows they are talking to an AI. The provider of a system that generates content has to mark it in a machine-readable format. For content-generating systems placed on the market before 2 August 2026, the machine-readable marking obligation applies from 2 December 2026. The deployer discloses deepfakes and labels text published to inform the public, unless it went through human review or editorial control and someone holds editorial responsibility for the publication. The basis: Article 50 of Regulation 2024/1689, the Commission's guidance.
From 11 August and 28 October 2026
Applies to companies operating in Poland
The Polish act on artificial intelligence systems came into force on 11 August 2026, and its Articles 8-18 and Chapters 3-5, 8 and 9 start to apply on 28 October 2026. The supervisory body is the Commission for the Development and Security of Artificial Intelligence, known as KRiBSI.
From December 2027 and August 2028
Applies to providers of high-risk systems
The obligations for Annex III systems moved to 2 December 2027, and those for AI embedded in regulated products to 2 August 2028. Regulation 2026/1744, known as the Digital Omnibus, made the change.
The regulation speaks of obligations, not of implementation. On the system side they come down to four things that have to be written down, not just agreed.
The four items below are the requirements for high-risk systems and, in practice, set out what a person assessing the system looks for. The common thread is simple: what the team holds in its head has to end up somewhere it can be read a year later, by someone who was not there at rollout.
The main responsibility for meeting them sits with the provider - whoever builds the system and places it on the market under their own brand. A company that bought a ready-made high-risk system is a deployer, with narrower duties set out in Article 26: among other things, it must use the system according to the instructions, provide the required oversight and keep the logs available to it. On the Polish market that distinction decides how much work there is - the national statistics office puts AI use at 8.7% of companies in 2025, most often through buying a ready commercial product rather than building one.
A company using a ready-made tool therefore does not write all of this documentation itself - it should obtain the relevant information from the vendor and settle the vendor's duties in the contract. The most common mistake is treating the four items as separate documents. In a running system they are linked: the log shows what data the model acted on, the description of oversight says who approved the result, and the documentation explains why the system makes that kind of decision at all. When one link is missing, the others lose their value as evidence.
The purpose of the system, its limits, data sources, integrations and how the model operates. The description has to be enough for someone who did not build the system to understand what it does and what it does not.
A record of which data a decision rested on, what the model did and who approved the result. The log has to be kept for as long as the rules and its purpose require - not just until the session ends - and still be readable months later.
A statement of what the model does on its own, what needs approval, and who can stop it. Oversight without that stop is a declaration, not a mechanism.
Where the input data come from, who owns them, and what happens when a source changes. Without that you cannot explain why the system answered the way it did.
Three questions come up in every conversation about the EU AI Act, and an engineer answers none of them.
Separating the technical work from the legal work is not a hedge, it is a division of expertise. The engineer knows what the system does, but not how the regulation classifies it. The lawyer knows the classification, but not the system. The compliance assessment only emerges where the two kinds of knowledge meet.
The practical takeaway: run the technical preparation and the legal analysis side by side. The classification may take months, and whatever it concludes, it will need the same material. By the time the lawyer finishes it, the necessary information is already prepared.
Classification follows the intended purpose and the way the system is used, not the technology. Formally the provider classifies the system. Because that turns on reading the regulation, in practice it should be done with a lawyer's support.
The provider runs the conformity assessment procedure: depending on the type of system, on internal control or with a notified body (Article 43). The material for it - documentation, logs, the description of oversight - is produced technically, while reading the regulation usually takes a lawyer.
The role follows whose brand the system reaches the user under, and who changes what it is for - not who wrote the code. The same company is often both, for different systems.
None of them depends on settling whether the system is high-risk. Each one reduces the work once that question is settled.
The order matters. The inventory comes first, because you cannot describe or limit a system you do not know about. Decision boundaries come second, because only then is it clear what to log. Logs and documentation come third, because without boundaries they record everything or nothing. The review closes the loop, because a description that never changes stops matching a system that does.
There is no need to launch a separate, elaborate project - which is just as well, because few companies have the resources for one: in the EFL AI Barometer for the first half of 2026, only 7% of Polish SMEs rated their readiness for AI deployments as high, and 43% rated their own competence as low. In the example company the whole set is one table, one conversation about when the chatbot should hand the customer over to a person, and one setting in the vendor's panel. Trying to describe every possible scenario up front usually ends in a document nobody updates.
The four actions are: an inventory of the AI tools in use, setting decision boundaries, turning on logs along with the system documentation, and booking a periodic review. Each one is below, in that order.
Write down where a model runs in the company: your own deployments, vendors, plug-ins and tools someone switched on without a project. For each one, note what it is for, who uses it and what data passes through it. The tools brought in by teams without IT usually hold the most surprises.
For each system, set what it does alone, what a person approves, and who can switch it off. Write it as a rule that can be checked - for example a threshold above which the result goes to a person rather than to the customer.
Decide which events and information you actually need to reconstruct how the system worked - for example the result, the moment a case was handed to a person, and who approved a decision. Record only as much data as that takes, and set how long you keep it and why. That way the trail can be squared with data minimisation and storage limitation under Article 5 GDPR. Describe the system well enough to explain it without its author: purpose, limits, data sources, known limitations.
Set a date on which you check that the description still matches what the system does. A change of model, data source or approval threshold is a reason to review outside the calendar.
Every legal statement and every figure here has a source. As of September 2026.
The EU AI Act timetable has already been changed once since the regulation came into force, and it may change again. Before a decision that turns on a date, check the current text at the source rather than in an article - this one included.
It depends on the role. The transparency obligations in Article 50 bind the provider of a system that talks to a person (telling the user they are talking to an AI), the provider of a system that generates content (marking it in a machine-readable format) and the deployer (disclosing deepfakes and labelling text published to inform the public, unless it went through human review or editorial control and someone holds editorial responsibility for the publication). A company that bought a ready-made chatbot checks that the vendor meets its duties. Whether the system is also high-risk is settled on the text of the regulation rather than technically: formally the provider classifies it, in practice with a lawyer's support. Whatever the answer, it pays to have written down where a model runs in the company, what it does on its own, and which data and events it records.
It is a legal category, not a technical one. A high-risk system is, among other things, one that acts as a safety component of a regulated product, or one used in an area listed in Annex III, such as recruiting staff and assessing candidates, decisions on access to essential services, or certain biometric uses. What decides is the intended purpose and the way the system is used, not the model behind it. An ordinary chatbot answering questions about services and lead times is, as a rule, not high-risk; a similar system used to assess job candidates may be. For such systems the EU AI Act provides for technical documentation, event logging and human oversight, among other things. The provider makes the formal classification as a self-assessment; because it turns on reading the regulation, it should be made with a lawyer's support.
In stages. The prohibited practices have applied since February 2025, the transparency rules towards users since August 2026 (for content-generating systems placed on the market before 2 August 2026, the machine-readable marking obligation applies from 2 December 2026), and the obligations for Annex III high-risk systems were moved to December 2027 by Regulation 2026/1744. In Poland, KRiBSI supervises under the act on artificial intelligence systems. The timetable does get adjusted, so check the current version from the Commission before you decide anything.
Yes, but what it has to do depends on the kind of system and how it is used. Such a company is usually a deployer, not a provider, and does not answer for the compliance of the system itself. If the system is high-risk, it must, among other things, use it according to the instructions, provide the required oversight and keep the logs available to it (Article 26). If it offers the tool to users under its own brand, or substantially changes what it is for, it can become a provider with all the duties that follow.
No. Governance produces the material for the assessment: documentation, logs, decision roles and monitoring. The conformity assessment procedure itself is run by the provider - depending on the type of system, on internal control or with a notified body (Article 43) - and usually with a lawyer, because it turns on reading the regulation. At CrAIT we design that first part together with maintaining the solution after deployment.
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